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This Thesis was made to study Profinet networks and means to secure them. The assign-
ment for this Thesis came from Mission Critical Network team of Pöyry Finland Oy. 
 
The objective of this thesis was to study Profinet networks; what they are, how they differ 
from standard office networks and how they are secured.  
 
The first part of the thesis covers some basics of Ethernet technology along with the net-
working reference models OSI and TCP/IP. The second part is about Profinet itself and 
how Profinet networks are designed. The final part includes common methods for securing 
Profinet networks and descriptions of three attacks against Profinet. 
 
Industrial systems are moving towards Industrial Ethernet which is based on standard 
Ethernet used everywhere nowadays. It is a totally different world from the traditional serial 
based field bus systems which were designed to be implanted in totally isolated networks 
where cyber security was not a concern unlike today when everything is connected via 
different networks. Today, network engineers designing industrial networks need to know 
the demands and requirements of automation applications along with the threats of mod-
ern networks and how to protect against them. 
 
As a conclusion, Profinet seems like a solid concept but the devices it is used in have vul-
nerabilities. Vendors are working on updates but the updates need to be done and de-
ployed fast. Meanwhile vendors just give advice on how to mitigate problems but this is not 
acceptable. Problems need to be resolved, not just trust in firewalls to keep the attackers 
out. For the most part, Profinet networks are secured with the same technologies as other 
Ethernet based networks. The only exception comes from how security aspects are em-
phasized. In automation networks the emphasis is more on availability when office envi-
ronments consider confidentiality to be more important. 
Keywords Profinet. Industrial Ethernet, Cyber security, automation net-
work, control network 
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Tämän työn tarkoituksena oli tutustua Profinet –verkkoihin, niiden tietoturvaan ja ottaa sel-
vää miten Profinet –verkoista tehdään tietoturvallisia. Työ tehtiin Pöyry Finland Oy:n MCN 
teamin toimeksiannosta. 
 
Työssä käydään ensin läpi Ethernet –tekniikkaa sekä teollisuusympäristöihin suunnattua 
teollisuuden Ethernet –tekniikkaa  yleisesti läpi. Tämän jälkeen tutustutaan Profinet –
tekniikkaan ja sen vaatimuksiin. Viimeisessä osassa käydään läpi teollisuusverkkojen ja 
Profinetin tietoturvaa ja esitellään kolme Profinettiin liittyyvää hyökkäystä. 
 
Teollisuusverkot siirtyvät yhä enenevissä määrin Ethernet –pohjaisiin teknologioihin, joita 
kutsutaan Teollisuus-Ethernetiksi. Tämä asettaa aivan erilaisia vaatimuksia teollisuusverk-
kosuunnittelijoille. Vanhat sarjapohjaiset tiedonsiirtoteknologiat on suunniteltu sijaitsemaan 
täysin omissa suljetuissa verkoissaan, joten tietoturvalle ei ollut tarvetta samalla lailla kuin 
nykyään, kun kaikki ovat yhteydessä toisiinsa erilaisten verkkojen välityksellä. Tämä kaikki 
asettaa vaatimuksia tänä päivänä teollisuusverkkoja suunnitteleville tietoverkkosuunnitteli-
joille; heidän pitää tuntea teollisuusympäristöjen vaatimukset sekä modernien verkkojen 
uhat ja puolustuskeinot hyökkäyksiä vastaan.  
 
Profinet vaikuttaa olevan vankalla pohjalla mutta itse laitteissa, joissa Profinet –protokollaa 
käytetään, on haavoittuvuuksia. Valmistajat kyllä tekevät korjauksia ohjelmistoihin paika-
takseen aukkoja, mutta näissä päivityksissä yleensä kestää ja valmistajat tyytyvät vain 
antamaan neuvoja miten lieventää haavoittuvuuksien vaikutuksia. Tämä lähestymistapa ei 
ole oikea tapa hoitaa haavoittuvuuksia. Haavoittuvuudet pitää paikata mahdollisimman 
nopeasti eikä vain luottaa siihen, että hyökkääjät eivät pääse sisälle verkkoon. Profinet-
verkot suojataan pitkälti samalla lailla kuin mikä tahansa muu Ethernet –pohjainen verkko. 
Eroja tulee siinä miten tietoturvanäkökulmia painotetaan. Teollisuusverkoissa painotetaan 
verkkojen käytettävyyttä ja saatavuutta, kun taas toimistoverkoissa voidaan kärsiä hieman 
verkkokatkoksista kunhan data pysyy tallessa. 
Avainsanat Profinet, Teollisuus-Ethernet, tietoturva, automaatioverkot, hal-
lintaverkot 
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1 Introduction 
The automation field is at one of the greatest turning points in its history. Field commu-
nication systems are moving towards more flexible Ethernet-based communication 
standards from the old serial communication standards. These new Ethernet-based 
technologies demand a new way of thinking from both network and automation engi-
neers. 
One of the fastest growing Industrial Ethernet standards is Profinet which is the suc-
cessor to the widely used field communication standard Profibus. As the demand for 
Profinet continues to rise so does the demand for network engineers who are familiar 
with industrial environments and their special requirements for networks. 
The purpose of this thesis is to get familiar with Profinet, get to know how to secure 
Profinet networks and to produce general guidelines to the MCN team for designing 
secure Profinet networks. The idea for this thesis came from Mission Critical Networks 
(MCN) team of Pöyry Finland Oy which designs networks and provides consulting ser-
vices for mainly industry clients.  
The thesis starts with a brief look at the OSI and TCP/IP models and Ethernet. The 
second part of the thesis covers Industrial Ethernet and Profinet itself. The final part 
part is about securing Profinet networks and common methods for securing industrial 
networks. The final part also includes the description of three attacks against Profinet 
networks.  
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2 Networking Reference Models 
Networking reference models are an integral part of modern networks. They set a basis 
for data communications between different systems by defining a common architecture. 
The two models used are called the OSI model and the TCP/IP model. OSI model is 
the older from the two and uses seven layers to define the data communication of sys-
tems compared to the five layers of the TCP/IP model. 
2.1 OSI Model 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is commonly used to describe the 
layers by which data is processed in modern communication systems. The OSI model 
is produced by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the late 
1970s which makes it one of the oldest standards in use in telecommunications. [1]  
Although OSI model is almost 40 years old, it still succeeds in describing modern 
communication systems. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the OSI model and how it 
does the partitioning of the different functions into seven abstraction layers. By doing 
this the upper layers do not have to take part in the tasks of the lower layers and vice 
versa. For example a browser in the application layer does not have to take care of bit 
encapsulation in the physical layer. 
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Figure 1. OSI model [2]. 
Each of the seven layers serves a layer above them and is served by a layer below 
through services. [2: 40] 
An interface acts as a tunnel between layers enabling them to communicate with a lay-
er above and below it. Communication begins in the topmost layer, goes down through 
all the other layers to the lowest layer where the data is sent to the receiving device. 
For example when a user wants to look at a web page the browser sends a request for 
the web page using HTTP. This request goes all the way through to the physical layer 
where it is encapsulated and sent to the server hosting the web page. The server then 
replies and sends the requested web page to the browser for the user to look at. Be-
cause interfaces are precisely defined and the standards used are common the com-
munication between devices from different vendors is possible. 
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2.2 TCP/IP Model 
The TCP/IP model is a computer networking model which defines a set of protocols 
and rules for communication across interconnected networks such as the Internet. The 
TCP/IP model is named after the two best known and most used protocols which are 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). The TCP/IP model is a 
result of research funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) [4: 2]. 
The TCP/IP model specifies common applications such as electronic mail, terminal 
emulation, HTTP and file transfer in addition to the lower-layer protocols (such as TCP 
and IP). 
As Figure 2 illustrates the TCP/IP model is also a layered model but it has only four 
layers compared to the OSI model’s seven, though the functions of the layers are 
equivalent. The network access layer is identical to the OSI model layers 1 and 2. The 
Internet Protocol layer is equivalent to layer 3 in OSI model. The Host-to-Host 
Transport layer (TCP and UDP protocols) is comparable to layer 4 in OSI and lastly the 
application layer is comparable to the OSI layers 5, 6 and 7 combined. 
  
Figure 2. OSI vs. TCP/IP model (Microsoft, 2015) 
Although the architecture the OSI model is more widely used than that of the TCP/IP 
some of the protocols of OSI model are not valid anymore. Only a handful of the proto-
cols of the OSI model are still used, for example ISO-TSAP in industrial networks. The 
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protocols of the TCP/IP model are considered to be better suited for modern networks 
but the model itself is not used so much. [2: 45].  
3 Ethernet 
Ethernet was invented at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) by Metcalfe 
and Boggs [5: 15]. Over the course of 30 years the Ethernet standard has existed it has 
become the most popular and widely used network standard. Ethernet has grown from 
just connecting devices inside Local Area Networks (LAN) to being a universal connec-
tivity standard. [6] Ethernet has even been adapted to industrial environments (e.g. 
Industrial Ethernet) where it is starting to replace old serial based transmission tech-
nologies.  
3.1 Variants of Ethernet 
Several versions of Ethernet have been developed throughout its history. Originally 
Ethernet devices were connected through linear coaxial cables. This was in the 1980s 
when the data rate of the technology was 10 Mbps. Modern Ethernet supports six dif-
ferent data rates through twisted pair and fiber optic cables. [7] Coaxial cables are 
sometimes used but since twisted pair and fiber optics are more common today, only 
they are included at the following sections. 
3.1.1 Twisted Pair 
Twisted pair cable consists of strands twisted together in pairs, as shown in Figure 3, to 
prevent electromagnetic interference (EMI). Twisted pair cables can reach up to 
speeds of 100 Gbps. The two most common twisted pair based technologies today are 
Fast Ethernet which refers to Ethernet standards with data rate of 100 Mbps and Giga-
bit Ethernet with data rate of 1000 Mbps. These standards use Category 5 (Cat5) and 
Category 6 (Cat6) twisted pair cables. [8] 
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Figure 3. Unshielded twisted pair (UTP) cable with different twist rates (Wikipedia, 2015) 
It is possible to reach 40 Gbps or even 100 Gbps with twisted pair cable according to 
IEEE in the Ethernet standard but this higher bandwidth requires the use of newer Cat-
egory 7 and 8 cables. [7] 
3.1.2 Fiber Optics 
Optical fibers are usually thin strands of glass but cheaper plastic variants also exist. 
Because of the flexibility of optical fibers they can be bundled together as fiber optic 
cables. As can be seen in Figure 4, inside a fiber optic cable there are bundles of opti-
cal fibers. These bundles are placed around a central member which strengthens the 
cable. Around all of this is different jackets and coatings depending on the application 
the cable is intended to be applied to. Fiber optics also offer a much more secure and 
resilient transmission medium compared to traditional copper alternatives. This is due 
to electromagnetic interference (EMI) which is not an issue with fiber optic cabling 
since the data is transferred through pulses of light. This also prevents eavesdropping 
of the transferred data almost completely and gives a tremendous advantage for using 
in difficult industrial environments. 
While traditional copper based cables are used at the edge of networks in the access 
layer to connect end users and devices to the network, fiber optic cables are used in 
the backbones of networks. This is due to the installation costs of fiber optics compared 
to copper based solutions. There are two types of fiber optics available today, multi-
7 
 
 
mode fiber (MMF) and single mode fiber (SMF). [9] Figure 4 illustrates an optical fiber 
cable. 
 
Figure 4. Optical fiber cable (Wikipedia, 2009) 
Multimode Fiber 
Multimode fiber was the first optical fiber type to be manufactured and used commer-
cially. The multimode fiber gets its name from the fact that it carries multiple light rays, 
or modes, within the fiber core. Due to multimode fiber’s ability to carry multiple signals 
the fiber’s core is much larger than the ones found in single mode fibers. Multimode 
fiber’s core diameter is most commonly 50 or 62,5 µm. [10] The wavelengths used in 
multimode fibers are 850 and 1300 nm. The ISO 11801 standard determines three dif-
ferent multimode fiber classes.  
1. OM1 62,5/125 µm 
2. OM2 50/125 µm 
3. OM3 50/125 µm 
The first two classes, OM1 and OM2, are considered as legacy multimode fibers. If 
multimode fiber is installed today, it is the Laser Optimized 50/125 µm multimode fiber 
(OM3). It has a core diameter of 50 µm and a cladding of 125 µm. OM1 and OM2 mul-
timode fibers support speeds up to 1 Gbps using Light Emitting Diode (LED) transmit-
ters. OM3 on the other hand is powered with Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Laser 
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(VCSEL) which makes it possible to reach even 100 Gbps speeds but still retains the 
support for slower speeds. This makes it ideal for new installments. [11] 
Single Mode Fiber 
Single mode fibers are usually used in backbone networks and in communications be-
tween buildings. Because the cost of single mode fibers and the optics used with them 
has been steadily decreasing to the same level with multimode fibers so the use of 
single mode fibers in LANs has become a valid option. 
Single mode fibers have a core diameter of 9 µm and 125 µm cladding most common-
ly. Single mode fibers use wavelengths of 1310 nm 1550 nm for carrying the signal. As 
you can see from the figure 5 single mode fiber carries only one light pulse whereas 
multimode fiber carries multiple light pulses which bounce between the core walls. By 
only carrying one light pulse single mode fiber avoids dispersion caused by multiple 
pulses travelling in the core. Single mode fiber also has lower fiber attenuation than 
multimode fiber which enables single mode fibers to transmit more information in the 
same amount of time compared to multimode fiber. These traits enable single mode 
fiber to carry information much longer distances than multimode fiber. [9] Figure 5 illus-
trates light propagation in fiber. 
 
Figure 5. Light propagation in fiber (Lascomm, 2005) 
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3.2 Comparison 
Due to the fact that data communication over fiber optic cables is not affected by EMI it 
is very well suited for difficult and often harsh industrial environments. Fiber optic ca-
bles are also a good choice for communications over long distances since twisted pair 
cables can only be 100 meters long. Downside is that fiber optics costs more than tra-
ditional twisted pair cable solutions. This is not because fiber cable materials cost more 
but the installation is more demanding due to the need to splice optical fibers and fiber 
splicing requires specialized and expensive equipment along with expertise. 
4 Industrial Ethernet 
As Ethernet has established itself as the leading networking solution with its flexibility, 
performance and cost-effectiveness, many industry organizations have turned their 
attention towards it. Industry organizations have started integrating existing fieldbus 
architectures to industry environments by leveraging Ethernet technology and are call-
ing this Ethernet designed specifically for industry needs the Industrial Ethernet 
4.1 Same Technology, Different Approach 
. Demand for real-time and deterministic communications are perhaps the biggest dif-
ferences when comparing traditional “office Ethernet” to Industrial Ethernet [12]. As 
Figure 6 illustrates the further away we move from an office environment and traditional 
IT services towards plant floor automation the faster respond times are correspondingly 
needed. 
 
Figure 6. Demands for response times (PI North America, 2015) 
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In addition to custom protocol stacks and services Industrial Ethernet also refers to 
physical network components such as cables, connectors and network active devices. 
These components are often more rugged than their standard counterparts so that they 
can stand the harsh environments of most industrial premises. 
Industrial Ethernet takes the existing Ethernet standards and implements them to dif-
ferent industrial environments such as manufacturing control networks. 
For example in Figure 7 we see that Profinet implements its own real-time channel and 
QoS parameters at OSI layers 2, 3 and 4 which makes it possible to run time-
dependent and deterministic applications on top of normal Ethernet stack. [13] 
 
Figure 7. Using intelligent Ethernet for automation control [12]. 
Industrial Ethernets approach implementing standard Ethernet in industrial environ-
ments in three different ways depending on the real-time and cost requirements of ap-
plications. These three approaches are illustrated in Figure 8. 
1. The first approach, also known as Class A, uses standard Ethernet as defined 
in the IEEE standard 802.3, standard TCP/IP stacks and standard hardware. 
This approach is also considered to be the “best effort” approach since the real-
time performance is somewhat limited due to unpredictability in network active 
devices, for example switches. 
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2. The second approach, also known as Class B, takes into account the demands 
of real-time applications. It still uses standard networking hardware and stand-
ard Ethernet but adds prioritization to the table. This is done by bypassing the 
standard TCP/IP stack with custom process data protocol on OSI layers 3 and 
4. This protocol resides in the Ethernet frame where it is tagged to give it priori-
ty. This does not mean that TCP/IP protocols are abandoned, they still exist but 
their access to lower layers are limited by a custom layer that can be consid-
ered to act like a timing layer. 
3. The third approach, also known as Class C, highlights performance even further 
compared to the second approach. In addition to using the same prioritization 
techniques and custom protocols also dedicated hardware is implemented to 
increase performance. For example Profinet uses switches called the Special 
Real-time Ethernet Controllers. This approach is adapted if maximum real-time 
performance and determinism are required from the application, for example 
motion control. This approach also covers other communication types via vari-
ous channels parallel to the real-time channel. TCP/IP channel also exists alt-
hough it is bypassed by the real-time channels. Determinism is achieved 
through a technique called scheduling that enables the use of fixed transmis-
sion cycles and cyclic synchronization of network nodes. 
 
Figure 8. Different approaches for achieving real-time communications (Industrial Ethernet 
Book, 2012) 
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From the three approaches shown in Figure 8, Profinet adapts approaches two and 
three. By doing that Profinet covers many varying scenarios in the world of automation 
while still being able to provide real-time performance and determinism when needed. 
[14] 
4.2 IT Meets Automation 
Automation and corporate networks are traditionally separated from each other but as 
the automation field is moving towards Industrial Ethernet the separation of office and 
automation networks is not so absolute anymore. This brings many challenges for both 
automation and IT departments. 
Networking world with its myriad of protocols is familiar to IT departments, they know 
how networks work and are familiar with different protocols that run on networks. Au-
tomation department can leverage this knowledge of networks and protocols to make it 
easier to manage Ethernet based industrial networks. For example simple network 
management protocol (SNMP) provides diagnostic data such as retry counts and 
bandwidth among others which can be very useful and valuable to industrial system 
management. Another useful protocol is link layer discovery protocol (LLDP) which 
allows the discovery of the logical topology of the network among other things. [17] 
When integrating plant floor automation and other industrial systems to same networks 
IT department needs to recognize the unique requirements industrial environments and 
systems put on networks on both application and physical levels. This means that alt-
hough the corporate and industrial networks are physically connected, logically they 
are separated with for example firewalls. [17] 
4.3 Special Requirements 
Industrial Ethernet has some special requirements when compared to traditional office 
Ethernet. As mentioned before, industrial environments are often much harsher than 
traditional corporate office, this is maybe the most obvious difference. Plant floors can 
be full of oily vapors, the atmosphere is very hot and humid and EMI can be a real is-
sue. These environmental conditions are addressed by using, for example, M12 con-
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nectors for terminating data cables, devices with high Ingress Protection rating, e.g. 
IP6x, and EMI protection. 
Response times must be much faster than in the office world where for example email 
can take several seconds to reach its destination. This is not the case in industrial net-
works where control messages have to arrive in milliseconds with a jitter of microsec-
onds, especially when motion control applications are concerned. [15: 35] 
In addition to speed, determinism is also an important aspect. Arrival of the packets 
must be predictable.  
Ensuring uptime is crucial in industrial systems since even a little outage in production 
of for example a paper mill can cause a massive loss of income for the company. Up-
time is often ensured with redundancy on both logical and physical levels, for example 
redundant uplinks and redundancy protocols such as RSTP (Rapid Spanning Tree) 
and MRP (Media Redundancy Protocol). 
5 Profinet 
Profinet is an open Industrial Ethernet standard developed by the world association of 
Profibus and Profinet manufacturers and users, the Profibus International (PI).  Profinet 
is standardized in IEC 61158 and IEC 61784. Profinet encompasses applications with a 
wide range of real-time requirements. 
Profinet is a successor for the world’s most used field communication standard, Profi-
bus. Profibus is a serial based industrial communications standard which is over 25 
years old. Two variations of Profibus exist today; the more common of the two is Profi-
bus DP (Decentralized Peripherals) which is simple, low cost and high speed field-level 
communications technology, and the other common variation is the Profibus PA (Pro-
cess Automation) which is a more application specific technology. Profibus DP is gen-
erally designed for internal uses, like cabinet mounting, when Profibus PA is meant 
more for field implementations. Profibus DP devices use RS485 shielded twisted pair 
cabling in addition to fiber optic cables and Profibus PA runs on Machester Bus Pow-
ered (MBP) cable. Profibus utilizes master-slave communication technology with token 
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passing between masters. [16] Figure 6 illustrates the integration of Profinet to different 
system levels. 
 
Figure 9. Integration of Profinet to different system levels [17] 
The use of Profinet is very cost-effective due to its ability to integrate very well to exist-
ing networks without the need to modify the superordinate network. It can also be used 
to connect existing fieldbus systems to Ethernet-based networks through proxies as the 
figure 9 illustrates. 
All Profinet devices, both active and passive, are designed to function in the harsh in-
dustrial environments. Profinet can also be run on standard network devices if real-time 
requirements are met. [17]  
The development of Profinet started in 2000 and the first specification released was the 
Profinet CBA (component-based automation). Profinet CBA was designed for compo-
nent-based machine-to-machine communication via TCP/IP and object-oriented pro-
gramming. Profinet CBA is fully compatible with standard networking hardware. Anoth-
er version of Profinet is the Profinet IO which includes both Profinet RT and Profinet 
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IRT. Since Profinet is modular in nature the user can select the functions required by 
utilizing Profinet IO or CBA or both. 
5.1 Profinet Versions 
Profinet follows the three approaches of Industrial Ethernet with Profinet IO and 
Profinet CBA. From these two versions the former is meant for communication between 
controllers and IO devices with RT and IRT requirements and the latter for communica-
tion among controllers via TCP/IP with some RT requirements. Figure 10 shows the 
real-time requirements of Profinet versions. 
 
Figure 10. Real-time requirements of Profinet versions (Profibus International, 2014) 
In Figure 10 we see that Profinet CBA is mainly for non-real-time while Profinet RT 
handles factory and process automation and Profinet IRT is for the most demanding 
motion control applications such as robots on assembly lines. 
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5.1.1 Profinet CBA 
Profinet CBA, also known as Profinet Class A, is designed for machine-to-machine 
communication over TCP/IP and object-oriented programming. The idea behind 
Profinet CBA is that the system can be implemented by deploying different intelligent 
and autonomous subsystems which communicate with each other through controllers, 
i.e. controller/controller communication. 
Profinet CBA is a class 1 approach which supports the trend of shared automation sys-
tems where automation functions are divided between intelligent subsystems, this is 
illustrated in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Profinet CBA supports modular and intelligent distributed systems (Phoenix Contact, 
2010) 
Profinet CBA is an automation concept which uses both cyclic and acyclic communicta-
tion with even 10 ms response times. This is well suited for communication between 
controllers. When used solely TCP/IP communication, Profinet CBA supports systems 
with response time requirements of 100 ms and above. [18] 
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5.1.2 Profinet IO 
The system which Profinet uses to connect distributed I/O-devices directly to Ethernet 
is called Profinet IO. Profinet follows the provider/consumer model where provider 
sends the data to be handled to the consumers. Figure 12 illustrates the three device 
classes distinguishes by Profinet. 
IO-controller is typically the device where the automation program runs, i.e. program-
mable logic controller (PLC). The output data for IO devices is administered by IO con-
trollers. 
IO-device operates as a distributed I/O field device that is connected to one or more 
IO-controllers via Profinet IO. 
IO-supervisor acts as an engineering tool for diagnostics and parameterization. The IO-
supervisor can be a personal computer (PC), human machine interface (HMI) for com-
missioning and diagnostic purposes. [18] Figure 12 shows the device classes and 
communication paths for Profinet IO. 
 
Figure 12. Device classes and communication paths for Profinet IO (PI, 2011) 
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Communication happens mostly via unmodified Ethernet and TCP/IP packets and net-
work devices in Profinet environments. This enables integration into office network 
quite painlessly. 
In Profinet RT, also known as Profinet Class B, the process data communication oc-
curs via optimized protocol stack on OSI Layers 3 and 4 in parallel with TCP/IP.  Every 
device gets an IP-address through the TCP/IP which also allows communication via 
other protocols such as HTTP. In addition to optimized protocol, prioritization is also 
used. Figure 13 illustrates how the Ethernet frame looks like in Profinet RT communica-
tions. 
 
Figure 13. Data tansmission of Profinet RT in the Ethernet frame [18]. 
In Figure 13 we see an Ethernet frame and the protocol stack. This Ethernet frame is 
comprised of a header and a Profinet data partitions. The possible prioritization tag of 
Profinet real-time messages is located in the Ethernet header. [17] 
Prioritization is implemented by assigning VLAN ID 0 with priority 6 in accordance with 
the IEEE 802.1Q standard. For this to work, though, messages with Ethernet type 
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0x8892, which tells that the packet contains Profinet data, must be accepted and for-
warded in the used switches. 
 
Figure 14. Ethernet frame with Profinet RT protocol data and priority tag [17]. 
Figure 14 shows how priority tag and an Ethernet type 0x8892 is used in the Ethernet 
frame to tell that Profinet communication is taking place in Profinet RT and IRT. 
Profinet IRT, also known as Class C, is used when maximum real-time is needed, for 
example motion control applications. The feature set of Profinet IRT is equivalent to 
Profinet RT but real-time performance is increased with special hardware. Profinet IRT 
is based on an extension of the Ethernet stack as shown in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15. Data transmission of Isochronous Real-time [18]. 
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Profinet IRT allows devices on the Profinet network to synchronize their communication 
with the use of scheduling, i.e. time-slot technology. Scheduling means that in every 
communication cycle a slot is specified for IRT data and clock signal. 
Profinet RT and IRT communications use optimized protocol stack on OSI Layer 3 and 
4 for the real-time channel. This means that Profinet RT and IRT communication by-
passes the whole TCP/IP portion of the protocol stack and does not get an IP address. 
In other words RT and IRT communications are restricted to one logical subnet [17]. 
This does not mean that packets cannot be routed from one subnet to another. Profinet 
CBA can be used to pass packets via TCP/IP although this introduces minor delay 
compared to plain real-time communication. [17] 
5.2 Application Profiles 
Profinet application profiles are used to specify different features and functions, such 
as particular properties, performance characteristics, of Profinet for use in specific de-
vices or applications. Roughly two groups of applications are distinguished; general 
application profiles that can be applied to different applications in general, for example 
PROFIsafe and PROFIenergy, and specific application profiles that are developed for 
specific use cases such as PROFIdrive for drive technology. [19] 
5.2.1 PROFIsafe 
PROFIsafe is a standard for functional safety (fail-safe) in accordance with the safety 
standard IEC 61508. PROFIsafe eliminates the need for additional wiring by enabling 
the fail-safe messages to be transmitted directly to the process controller. PROFIsafe is 
compatible with both Profinet and Profibus alike. PROFIsafe can handle different fault 
situations like address errors, significant delays and data loss with for example time 
monitoring and authenticity monitoring. [19] 
5.2.2 PROFIenergy 
High cost of energy and legal obligations forces industry to come up with greener and 
more efficient energy technologies. PROFIenergy is Profinet’s answer to this. 
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PROFIenergy is an effective, active energy management technology which saves en-
ergy and reduces energy costs by purposefully switching off unneeded devices. [19] 
5.2.3 PROFIdrive 
PROFIdrive is an application-oriented profile for Profibus and Profinet which contains 
syntax and semantics for drives and automation systems to communicate with each 
othe. It is standardized in IEC 61800-7. PROFIdrive’s goal is to offer vendor neutrality, 
interoperability and investment protection. [19] 
5.3 Network Topology 
Since Profinet is Ethernet based technology it supports very flexible networks with an 
almost unlimited number of options for topology. PI organization introduces three basic 
topologies or Profinet; star, tree and line. 
5.3.1 Star Topology 
In a star topology all devices are connected to one central switch with its own cable as 
shown in the figure 16. This central switch, or node, acts as a repeater for data flow. 
The main advantage with star topology is that if one node fails, the other are not affect-
ed by it. The main disadvantage is that if the central node fails, all the other nodes lose 
connectivity. The star topology is particularly useful if devices are physically located 
near each other, e.g. in a cabinet. [20] Star topology is illustrated in Figure 16 below. 
 
Figure 16. Star topology [20]. 
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5.3.2 Tree Topology 
A tree topology is basically a combination of star topologies. For example in an indus-
trial plant different parts of the plant can be designed with star topology and then con-
nected to each other via neighboring switches as seen in figure 17. The main ad-
vantage is that a large network can be “divided” into smaller more easily manageable 
parts. The main disadvantage of the tree topology is the same as in the star topology. If 
the central node fails, all the other nodes lose connectivity. [20] Tree topology is illus-
trated in Figure 17 below. 
 
Figure 17. Tree topology [20]. 
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5.3.3 Line Topology 
In automation the line topology is a well-known concept where devices, or nodes, are 
linked to each other in series as illustrated in figure 18. Profinet environments all 
Profinet devices equipped with integrated switching capability can form a line topology 
thus eliminating the need for discreet switches. The main advantage of line topology is 
its easy installation and the simplicity of design. The main disadvantage is that if one 
device in the line fails the others lose connectivity unless the line is extended to a ring 
topology which increases the system’s redundancy. Ring topology is essentially a line 
topology where both ends of the line is connected to a central switch. [20] Line topolo-
gy is illustrated in Figure 16 below. 
 
Figure 18. Line topology with integrated switching capabilities in Profinet devices [20]. 
5.4 ProfiCloud 
Profinet also supports cloud functions via a technology called Proficloud. The cloud 
functions can also be added to existing installations. Proficloud, as illustrated in figure 
19, allows Profinet users to utilize modern cloud services and telecontrol applications 
with ease to control remote locations centrally. With Proficloud users can import valua-
ble data from Profinet systems to cloud servers such as usage and network statistics. 
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 Proficloud implementation has always at least one cloud coupler and one cloud de-
vice. In Figure 19 we see how Profinet devices are connected to Proficloud. The cloud 
coupler has two Ethernet ports, one for the local network connection and one for con-
necting to the Internet. The coupler automatically sets up a connection to the Proficloud 
so that it is operational after a short period of time. This is accomplished by preconfig-
uring the cloud devices before setting them up at the preferred location. With precon-
figured devices Proficloud tries to reduce complexity of setting up a VPN connection. 
Network data is obtained via DHCP. [21]  
 
Figure 19. Overview of the Proficloud concept [21]. 
Data transmission is encrypted with TLS encryption which is also used, for example, in 
banking solutions. With the use of WebSockets as data transfer points, Proficloud aims 
to be firewall friendly. This is because WebSocket is a standardized web mechanism 
which uses ports 80 and 443. [21] 
Connecting devices to the Internet presents a risk for unauthorized access. Proficloud 
takes this into account by only allowing outbound traffic. Connections from the Internet 
are denied. In addition Proficloud devices do not have any open ports. 
Connecting production networks straight to the Internet is not considered to be a good 
method. The cloud coupler contains two separate network cards for local network and 
the Internet, these network cards are not linked via TCP/IP.  The communication be-
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tween the network cards is handled solely on the application layer and is limited to 
Profinet-relevant data. [21] 
5.5 Transmission 
Profinet supports full-duplex Ethernet network where it offers two options for transmis-
sion media in RT and IRT applications; fiber optic and copper cables. Profinet allows 
communication also via wireless media, such as WLAN and Bluetooth, when Profinet 
CBA is used. These cables can be terminated with different connectors depending on 
installation location needs. Profinet uses 2-pair cable for 100 Mbps and 4-pair cable for 
Gigabit cabling systems. Figure 20 illustrates the different industrial plugs used in 
Profinet installations. 
 
Figure 20. Industrial plug connectors for Profinet [19]. 
In Figure 20 we see different industrial plug connectors for Profinet cabling. Profinet 
can use standard connectors when installing devices in non-industrial environments 
where rugged connectors are not needed. SC-RJ connector is a small-form-factor fiber 
optic connector designed for industrial use. It small enough to fit in the same space as 
RJ45 connector but is based on SC connector. M12 connector is a connector designed 
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for industrial use. It uses a locking system to ensure connectivity harsh industrial envi-
ronments. [23] M12 features Ingress Protection up to IP68 (dust tight and protection 
against long periods of immersion under pressure) [24].  
5.6 Integration with Overall Network 
Integration of automation areas with real-time communication into overall network is 
generally a problem-free procedure. However, a fact that Profinet RT and IRT commu-
nication can only happens at layer 2 domain must be taken into consideration. Profinet 
RT and IRT communication can be routed via TCP/IP by using Profinet CBA but this 
method introduces a moderate decrease in the real-time performance. [22] 
Even the use of prioritization does not limit integration of Profinet to the overall network 
since Profinet and other Industrial Ethernet solutions use the same ordinary QoS 
(Quality of Service) mechanism, such as the priority byte in the Ethernet packet as de-
scribed in the standard 802.3Q, as in the office world. [17] 
Since Ehernet based communication systems are increasingly responsible for commu-
nications in industrial environments in the form of Industrial Ethernet, the need for se-
curity is also on the rise. This does not mean that security has not been a concern be-
fore but the nature of security has changed towards modern technologies and tech-
niques such as firewalls and IPS/IDS systems.  
6 Security of Profinet Networks 
Ethernet based Profinet and Industrial Ethernet offers excellent performance, scalabil-
ity, flexibility and integration for industrial applications. In addition to enabling the use of 
open and standardized IT technologies, such as WLANs and web applications, they 
offer a wide range of network security measures for protecting manufacturing devices 
and other automation components. [26] 
Availability, integrity and confidentiality are often considered as the three most im-
portant points of network security in automation networks. From these three availability 
is often considered to be the most important from the manufacturing angle. This means 
that automation and control systems must be operational at all times, no downtime is 
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allowed. Integrity means that systems and data must be kept intact and protected from 
intentional or accidental modification. Confidentiality ensures that unauthorized users 
cannot access data. [26] 
Security cannot be pinned down to just one place. Everything and everyone is part of 
the system security. This includes both IT and automation departments, management, 
site/company security and guards as well as automation component manufacturers. 
Company policy plays also a big role in security. Company policy defines to a large 
extent the security measures and approaches which will be implemented. [26] 
Profibus International offers following guidelines for a good security architecture.  
 Strong enough to protect systems but at the same time simple enough to be 
manageable with tolerable effort and understood by everyone involved, whether 
it is the installer or security expert.  
 Universal so that it can be applied to similar cases. Myriad of exceptions makes 
the system unmanageable and difficult to detect violations and deficiencies. 
 Supported by all parties. If everyone supports the cause and knows why securi-
ty architecture is relevant, they will probably work more effectively. 
 Called into question by everyone. When a weak point, deficiency, a bug or other 
anomaly in the network is discovered, it should be reported and fixed as soon 
as possible. 
 Made into a daily activity. It should not left as it were on the installation day. [25] 
All of the above aspects make up a unified security design, i.e. security architecture, 
which addresses potential risks and requirements for the network in different scenarios 
and environments. 
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6.1 Hacks and Vulnerabilities 
When the protocols used in industrial systems, such as ISO-TSAP (International 
Standards Organization Transport Access Point), were designed the security concepts 
of that day were considered. It meant that the protocols had no security since the con-
trol systems were designed to be deployed in completely isolated networks. Same 
goes for the PLCs, they were designed and built without security since they were de-
ployed in isolated networks. [28] 
The situation today is that the security concepts used have not caught up with the pro-
found change we have seen in cyber security in recent years. Even isolated or sepa-
rated networks aren't safe, this was demonstrated by a computer worm Stuxnet which 
spread via an infected USB flash drive and attacked industrial PLCs in Iran in 2010. 
[28] 
The following sections introduce three different exploits or hacks. What all these meth-
ods have in common is that they are conducted from within the automation network 
and they are aimed at devices capable of running Profinet and other industrial proto-
cols. These hacks and vulnerabilities expose the devices for reconnaissance and ex-
ploitation which allows the attacker to collect valuable information or even physically 
brake crucial process components, for example Stuxnet caused the fast-spinning cen-
trifuges to tear themselves apart in the Iranian nuclear plant. 
6.1.1 Siemens Simatic S7 PLC Exploit 
PLCs are devices responsible for controlling critical processes in the field. PLCs can be 
found in myriad of places, such as energy plants, gas and oil refineries railways and 
pipelines. PLCs are relied to control and automate processes that require ladder logic 
and different input and output layouts. [28] 
Considering that PLCs are responsible for ensuring critical automation tasks, for exam-
ple the flow of electricity to homes, businesses and factories, it is odd that the security 
was almost completely ignored when the PLCs were designed and built. [28] 
PLCs have been evolving to take advantage of common networking standards like 
IEEE 802.3 Ethernet and IEEE 802.11 WiFi. The newer devices also support more 
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complex logics through increased storage space and processing power and capabili-
ties.  
The Simatic S7 exploit is not directly against Profinet itself but Profinet is used to con-
nect to the network. The attack itself takes advantage of ISO-TSAP which is used by 
Siemens engineering software to communicate and program all S7 PLCs made by 
Siemens. Other vendors also use ISO-TSAP but this section concerns only Simatic 
products. [28] 
From attackers point of view the fact that Simatic S7 PLCs communicate with ISO-
TSAP on TCP port 102 is interesting since packets transmitted over ISO-TSAP com-
munication are in plain text with no encryption, thus making it possible to launch man-
in-the-middle and replay attacks. It also allows easy capturing of packets travelling be-
tween engineering workstation and the PLC, thus enabling the attacker to reverse the 
protocol and generate their own packets for malicious purposes. Everything required to 
do this is baked in the Step 7 engineering software application. [28] 
In addition to using ISO-TSAP, the S7 PLCs has one other big weakness; the authenti-
cation is flawed. An attacker with captured packets containing the authenticated server 
session can just re-authenticate using the same packet. This can be very dangerous 
because of the way how the S7 PLCs handle the authentication process. [28] 
When the user sends an authentication packet to the PLC the password or hash in the 
packet is compared to the one configured in the device, if the comparison returns a 
value that is true, the device then grants access and allows read/write/execute permis-
sions to the PLC’s memory. This means that the attacker can configure the PLC any 
way he/she wants. [28] 
The Attack Vector 
1. Capture the traffic between the engineering workstation and the PLC. 
2. Extract and analyze the client portion of the packet. 
3. Build your own packet based on the extracted client portion. 
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4. Replay the crafted packets to the PLC. 
This type of exploit is easily avoidable by not letting people with malicious intents into 
the network but nowadays when everything is connected it is highly possible that 
someone will hack his way into the network eventually. In the situation of breached 
network, the use of common security measures, such as secure transmission chan-
nels, encrypted messages and the use of IPS/IPS, can prevent leaking of confidential 
data or at least greatly hinder the attacker so that the damage caused by the breach 
can be mitigated as much as possible. 
6.1.2 Emulation of Profinet IO-Devices 
Since Profinet IO uses standard Ethernet network components, it means that Profinet 
systems are also generally susceptible to same threats that are present in standard 
Ethernet networks, such as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack as seen in Figure 21, 
even ARP attacks like ARP poisoning can be conducted. In MITM attack a device, of-
ten a regular PC, poses as a valid communication partner for two devices by pretend-
ing to be something it is not, for example an IO device for an IO controller and vice ver-
sa. This allows the attacker to capture the communication between the two, send it to 
some unknown remote server or even inject modified configurations for the devices. 
These types of attacks are unknown for traditional fieldbuses. [29] 
 
Figure 21. Man-in-the-middle attack in Profinet system [29]. 
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The Profinet system in its basic form includes an IO controller and one or more IO de-
vices. These two components make up a connection called Application Relation (AR) 
between them.  This is done by the IO controller via UDP/IP with Distributed Computing 
Environment/Remote Procedure Calls (DCE RPC), which is a framework for cli-
ent/server applications. Profinet IO controller is responsible of assigning an IP address 
for IO devices. [29] 
Profinet IO devices are not only identified with IP addresses but Profinet names are 
also used, in fact Profinet devices are identified based on Profinet names rather than IP 
addresses. The Profinet names are assigned during the engineering phase and then 
saved in the IO device’s non-volatile memory. These names are then configured to the 
IO controller responsible of them along with the desired IP addresses. When the IO 
controller starts it first sends DCP-identify message to verify that the IO devices are 
reachable and have valid names. After querying of the names and before assigning the 
IP addresses, the IO controller checks with ARP requests whether any IO device has 
been configured with duplicate IP addresses. If duplicate IP addresses are not present, 
the IO controller assigns an IP address, establishes an AR and sends configurations 
via TCP/IP to the IO device. After sending configurations cyclic data transmission takes 
place and IP addresses are not used anymore until configurations are needed to 
change again. [29] 
This kind of setup is prone to errors if configuration is done carelessly. Two most criti-
cal and possible errors are duplicate IP addresses and Profinet names. These errors 
can be leveraged to launch MITM and ARP attacks in Profinet network, but few condi-
tions must be met; the attacking machine must be able to meet the same timing re-
quirements as the Profinet devices, for example if frames are sent in 1 ms cycles, the 
MITM machine must forward its own frames within the 1 ms cycle. If the MITM machine 
fails to do this, the whole attack fails for the reason that the switch updates its MAC 
table every time it receives a frame from the IO device. [29] 
Michael Baud and Max Felser from the Berne University of Applied Sciences experi-
mented on emulating a Profinet IO device in the Profinet system with an open-source 
MITM attack tool called Ettercap. They did not have any success in performing a MITM 
attack with Ettercap. The main reason for this was that the cyclic nature of data trans-
mission was too much for the software which supports cycle times of 1 second and 
above while Profnet can use 1 ms cycle times. In other words every time they started 
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an ARP poisoning attack by sending ARP frames with the intention to overwrite the 
ARP table of the target device, the valid IO data of the actual IO device resets the ARP 
table because the cyclic time is so much smaller than what Ettercap is capable of. [29] 
Figure 22 illustrates how the MITM attack is performed in the “bridged” mode. 
 
Figure 22. Performing the MITM attack in “bridged” mode [29] 
However, Baud and Felser were successful on their attempt with ARP poisoning when 
they modified their attack to be in “bridged” mode, this means that the MITM machine is 
between the IO controller and the actual IO device as illustrated in Figure 22. In this 
“bridged” mode the attacker physically connects himself inside the Ethernet connection 
he is interested in sniffing with two Ethernet ports. [29] 
6.1.3 ProFuzz 
Fuzzing, or fuzz testing, is a Black Box technique for testing software which is conduct-
ed by injecting random, invalid or unexpected data to the inputs of a computer pro-
gram. It can be semi-automated or even fully automated process. The basic idea be-
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hind fuzzing is that every program has bugs which are waiting to be discovered and a 
systematical approach will reveal them sooner or later. [30] 
ProFuzz is a Profinet fuzzer developed and released by Roland Koch and students at 
the University of Applied Sciences in Augsburg. ProFuzz uses the fuzzing framework of 
powerful packet manipulation program Scapy. ProFuzz supports fuzzing the following 
Profinet frame types. [31] 
- afr (Alarm Frame Random) 
- afo (Alarm Frames Ordered) 
- pnio (Cyclic RealTime) 
- dcp (DCP Identity Request) 
- ptcp (Precision Transparent Clock Protocol) 
ProFuzz fuzzer can be especially useful for vendors who develop their own Profinet 
stacks. [31] 
6.2 Connecting Automation and Office Networks 
Traditionally automation systems were built as stand-alone systems. These systems 
had little in the way of security but the Internet and Ethernet with their ubiquitous proto-
cols and networks changed everything. Today ICSs (Industrial Control System) are 
often connected one way or another to the corporate network, thus being potentially 
reachable from outside networks such as the Internet by a malicious party. 
Security goes both ways; while automation network must be protected from threats of 
the superordinate network and Internet, the overall network must also be protected 
from the threats of automation network. For example devices of external vendors which 
connect to the automation network are normally not subject to the security specifica-
tions, thus being potential middlemen in forwarding malicious software, e.g. Trojans, 
worms, malware. [17] 
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Profibus International introduces three common schemes for connecting automation 
and office networks; both physically and logically separated networks, logical integra-
tion into the overall network through firewall and logically separate networks with com-
mon physical topology. [17] 
6.2.1 Physical and Logical Separation 
Figure 23 illustrates the design of physical and logical separation of office and automa-
tion networks with the use of firewalls as logical transition points. This design gives the 
automation and office network their own physical and logical networks in parallel to 
each other. 
 
Figure 23. Logical and physical separation of office and automation networks [17]. 
A complete physical and logical separation design offers a clear separation between 
the office and automation networks which makes protecting and administering of the 
network less complicated. On the other hand investment and operating costs are high-
er due to the number of active and passive equipment needed to build two separate 
networks. 
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6.2.2 Logical Integration through Firewall 
Figure 24 illustrates how logical integration of automation cells can be done basically 
the same way as adding access switch to the distribution switch. In other words like 
connecting layer 2 switch to layer 3 switch. Profibus International recommends placing 
firewalls between layer 3 switches and automation networks in this design. Multiple 
automation areas can be protected with same firewalls. [17] 
 
Figure 24. Logically integrating automation network to the overall network through firewall [17]. 
This design offers a simple and easy way to integrate automation cells to existing net-
works. In addition it is highly expandable with new automation cells. The number of 
devices needed is greatly decreased as a result of sharing core and distribution layers. 
Therefore, investment costs with this design are much smaller compared to a design 
with full physical separation. [17] 
With this solution automation operators are more dependent on the superordinate IT 
network than in the previous solution which means that some sort of regulations may 
be in order, for example service level agreements. [17] 
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6.2.3 Common Physical Topology with Logical Separation 
The final design solution presented by Profibus International is a complete logical sepa-
ration. This design approach, as illustrated in Figure 25, differs from the previous de-
sign in that both the office and automation networks have common physical topology 
and use the same transition point, most commonly a firewall, for communication [17]. 
 
Figure 25. Logical separation via a firewall with common physical topology [17]. 
This approach gives complete and clear logical separation, thus granting protection 
from unauthorized access, virus and other malicious behavior. On the other hand the 
complexity of system architecture quickly rises when adding network components and 
software based connections which leads to high maintenance and operation costs. 
Especially troubleshooting becomes more difficult when network errors occur. This so-
lution also makes automation operators dependent on the superordinate IT network. 
[17] 
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6.3 Network Security Measures 
This chapter introduces some common security measures used in Industrial Ethernet 
networks. Since Industrial Ethernet is based on standard Ethernet, the same methods 
used to secure Ethernet networks also apply to Industrial Ethernet. 
6.3.1 Firewall 
Firewall is a network security system that acts as a barrier between networks. The 
through a firewall is controlled with a set of rules applied to outgoing and incoming traf-
fic. Firewall can be software based running on for example a server, or hardware based 
as a discreet device. Software based firewalls can be found everywhere, for example 
the most used operating system Windows has a built-in software firewall.  Hardware 
based firewalls are very versatile nowadays, they can be used, for example, for routing 
purposes or as a DHCP server in addition to protecting the network. 
Modern firewalls can inspect all the traffic going through them, even the contents of the 
packets with a process called deep packet inspection, and blocks the packets that does 
not meet the security criteria. Firewalls can also maintain the stateful information of the 
network, i.e. keeps track of the states of the connections in the network. Firewalls are 
used at connection points of networks, for example Internet and local network. [26] 
Figure 26 illustrates a layered industry network with separated production and corpo-
rate networks. 
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Figure 26. A layered industry network with separated production and office networks [26]. 
In industrial networks firewalls are used to separate production and office networks 
from each other, often by demarcating a DMZ between them as illustrated in Figure 26. 
A buffer zone between networks is called a DMZ (demilitarized zone). DMZ is used as 
a security measure for it allows the control of how data and services are shared be-
tween different zones, for example various servers can be located in a DMZ. [26] 
Firewalls can be divided in several types based on their functionality, though modern 
firewall and security systems have all these functions more or less integrated to them 
as well as some anti-virus functionality. These types of “hybrid” firewalls are generally 
referred to as Unified Threat Management (UTM) systems. 
So called first generation firewalls were based on packet filtering. This means that 
packets are inspected and compared to the filtering rules set in the firewall configura-
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tion. If a corresponding rule is found, the packet is either passed through or dropped 
depending on the rule set. Firewalls with only packet filtering do not care if packet is 
part of an existing stream, they just filter the packets based on the information inside 
the packet itself, for example source and destination address, protocol and port. Packet 
filtering firewalls work generally on first four layers of OSI model. [33] 
Second generation firewalls, or stateful firewalls, have the same functionality as packet 
filtering firewalls but they can operate up to the layer 4 of the OSI model and add the 
state of the connection to list of criteria used by the ruleset. Stateful firewalls can record 
all connections passing through and detect whether or not the packet is a part of an 
existing connection or start of a new connection. This is done through a technique 
called stateful packet inspection. [33] 
Third generation firewalls, also known as the next-generation firewalls or application 
layer firewalls, can detect anomalies within the applications and control input, output or 
access to and from applications. This is done by a technique called deep packet in-
spection where the firewall inspects the packets for unwanted connections. The firewall 
can block connections in otherwise allowed ports if an unwanted protocol wants to use 
it or detect and block protocols that are exploited. In other words next-generation fire-
walls are able to “understand” some protocols, such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 
Domain Name System (DNS) and HTTP. [33] 
6.3.2 IPS/IDS 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are usually 
deployed inside networks where they monitor network traffic for anomalies, such as 
malicious code and unusual behavior that could give away hackers, and then log and 
even block connections if anything comes up. [27] 
IPS and IDS systems synergize well with firewalls. Functionalities of firewalls are based 
on rules that tell whether to block or not the packet whereas IPS and IDS analyze the 
packets more thoroughly and can decide whether the traffic is legit. [27] 
IPS and IDS are usually used against, policy violations, exploits, reconnaissance and 
DOS/DDOS attacks. 
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 Policy violations include infringed rules, protocols, packet designs etc. such as 
an IP packet with incorrect length. 
 Exploits are attempts to abuse or manipulate systems or programs through vul-
nerabilities. Buffer overflow attack is a good example of an exploit of a hole in 
programs code. 
 Reconnaissance attacks are a common way for attackers to obtain information 
from systems through, for example, port scans to determine open ports. 
 (Distributed) Denial of Service attack (DoS/DDoS) is an attack that attempts to 
overthrow a system by flooding it with external requests. [27] 
IPS and IDS function almost identically, the only difference comes from IPS’s ability to 
block or quarantine connections and IP addresses. Both systems looks for suspicious 
traffic by inspecting the header and data portions of packets. It then compares the re-
sults to a signature database compiled from past and potential attacks, some vendors 
even support integration with antivirus software, and then decides what to do based on 
rules defined by policies. IPS and IDS solutions are able to learn to differentiate normal 
network traffic from abnormal network traffic, this is called anomaly based detection. 
Rule based systems are also supported. In rule based IPS and IDS systems a 
knowledge base of programmed rules is used alongside an inference engine. The 
beauty of the inference engine and knowledge base lies in the way how the IPS and 
IDS systems can mimic the way human mind deducts, thus making assumptions of the 
network traffic and then decide the appropriate action to be taken. IPS and IDS can be 
powerful devices when used correctly since they can produce intolerable amounts of 
false positives if configured vaguely of with insufficient knowledge of the normal data 
traffic of the network. [27] 
6.3.3 Physical Protection 
Physical protection is a security aspect many fail to grasp with the importance it should 
be. Every device from cross connection to servers should be placed installed and 
placed appropriately, usually in network cabinets, in a way that prevents unauthorized 
access to input interfaces, such as USB and Ethernet ports, and protects the devices 
from tampering. Environmental conditions have to be considered if the network devices 
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are installed outdoors. Good example of failed physical security is Stuxnet which 
spread through an infected USB flash drive that someone plugged into an unattended 
computer. 
6.3.4 Redundancy 
Automation applications must be available at all times with zero tolerance for downtime 
due to the real-time nature of the applications. Continuous uptime can be ensured with 
redundancy measures in both data link and physical layers of OSI model. [26] 
Common ways to achieve high uptimes and availability at the physical layer are the use 
of devices with resilient features, for example multiple power supplies. Some devices 
even support inline upgrade of components which means that they can be repaired 
without disrupting the services they are responsible for, this is a great way to improve 
MTTR (mean time to repair). The use of multiple redundant devices also improves 
availability and resiliency of the network through technologies such as Cisco’s Virtual 
Switching System (VSS) and HP’s Intelligent Resilient Framework (IRF) that allows 
switches to be clustered in a manner that in the case of one switch malfunctioning the 
other switch in the cluster takes over. [26] Figure 27 illustrates a star topology with re-
dundant links to layer 3 switches. 
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Figure 27. Star topology with redundant links [26]. 
Redundancy can be also achieved through implementations in the data link layer with 
redundant links and redundant paths for data transmission. This is done by using re-
dundant network topologies such as redundant star topology or redundant ring topolo-
gies. In a redundant star topology, as shown in figure 26, access layer switches are 
connected to every distribution layer switch, thus creating multiple redundant paths for 
data transmission. [26] 
A ring topology is formed when each device is connected to its neighbor, in other words 
ring topology is a line topology which is connected at both ends. Access switches form 
the actual ring which is then connected to the distribution switches. This allows the data 
to flow uninterrupted when any one of the devices in the ring malfunctions. Figure 28 
illustrates a ring topology with redundant links to layer 3 switches. 
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Figure 28. A ring topology [26]. 
Profinet uses two mechanisms for recovering from failure of any one device in the ring; 
Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) and Media Redundancy for Planned Duplication 
(MRPD). MRP is used in rings where TCP/IP and Profinet RT frames and has recovery 
times under 200 ms. MRPD is used with Profinet IRT communications due to its ability 
to offer smooth and seamless switchover of communication paths in the event of failure 
of any one device. This is done by preloading the communication path data to the de-
vices at the system startup. [19] 
6.3.5 Remote Access 
Allowing remote access to the network always poses a risk for the whole network. 
Therefore sufficient security measures must be taken. Profinet uses Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) technologies to establish a secure connection between two networks or 
to enable a remote connection from a workstation to the control network. Two ma-
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chines, often firewalls, form a secured VPN tunnel which basically acts like an exten-
sion of the private network. [17] Figure 29 shows a simple remote access concept. 
 
Figure 29. Simple remote access concept [26]. 
VPNs encrypt the messages travelling through the tunnel created between the end-
points. This encryption is done by utilizing security protocols such as IP Security Archi-
tecture (IPsec), Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). Two 
main types of VPNs exist based on how they are used. These are a site-to-site VPN for 
connecting multiple remote locations into a single network and a remote access VPN 
for connecting individual users to the private network. [32] 
The site-to-site VPN is established between two devices located at both sites, usually a 
router or a firewall. This allows the two sites to act as a single network although they 
are physically in different locations. Encryption and decryption can be software or 
hardware based. Site-to-site links can be implemented with, for example, IPsec or 
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MPLS VPN. MPLS VPN is very flexible and scalable option for site-to-site connection 
but it is not as easy to set up as other option available. [32] 
Remote access VPNs are used mainly for allowing individual users to connect to pri-
vate networks over public networks such as the Internet. One of the most commonly 
used remote access VPN protocol is the SSL protocol which creates a secure connec-
tion for Internet applications, for example a connection from a PC browser to applica-
tion server can be encrypted by using SSL. One major advantage of SSL is that it can 
be used without any dedicated software since it uses the browser as the client applica-
tion. [32] 
The use of VPNs alone does not offer a full protection for remote access connections. 
What if an unauthorized person gets his hands on your computer? If that computer 
happens to have access data saved the unauthorized person can connect to the pri-
vate network and do something harmful. This can be prevented with the use of different 
authentication methods. In addition to configuring a VPN connection, a passwords can 
be used. Passwords can be fixed or generated every time with a dedicated password 
generator. Passwords can also be used together with some other verification method 
such as verification code sent via SMS message. This is called a two factor authentica-
tion (2FA). Certificates are also a common method to verify connections as is the case 
with SSL.  
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7 Discussion and Conclusions 
Ethernet is steadily establishing itself as the bedrock for almost all communication. This 
is possible due to Ethernet’s flexibility, universality and very cost-effective pricing. Even 
the industry has started the migration to Industrial Ethernet. The world’s most used field 
bus technology, Profibus, has a successor, Profinet, which uses Ethernet based com-
munications. This means that network engineers need to educate themselves with 
basic knowledge of automation systems, or at least get familiar with them, and automa-
tion engineers need to know the basics concerning Industrial Ethernet applications and 
protocols such as Profinet. 
The main problem with traditional Profinet and other industrial protocols is that they use 
very old and obsolete devices and technologies. A good example is the ISO-TSAP pro-
tocol which is used between Profinet IO controller communications, such as Siemens 
Simatic S7 controllers. It is over 20 years old and uses no encryption at all but is still 
included and used in new industrial devices because that is the way things have been 
always done. The use of ISO-TSAP is most likely just the tip of the iceberg. If some-
thing as old as ISO-TSAP is used then probably something else that leaves the devices 
vulnerable is also used. Problematic is also the thought that networks are safe as long 
as they are physically and logically separated from the corporate network with DMZ 
and firewall solutions. This is not enough as the three attacks introduced Chapter 6.3 
demonstrate. Security is also needed inside the networks and this can be done with, for 
example, IPS/IDS solutions which actively monitor the network. 
The majority of vulnerabilities come across in the present strudy were not directly tar-
geted to Profinet itself but against the devices Profinet is used in and the attackers 
must first try to get in to the network. Profinet itself seems like a very solid concept 
overall but the devices that use it have some critical vulnerabilities. This is very con-
cerning since the devices responsible for providing electricity to our homes or keeping 
nuclear plants from blowing up are the ones using Profinet devices with these vulnera-
bilities. Fortunately vendors are working on software updates and patches, even 
though the speed with which they are done is not very high, meanwhile they just advice 
the users of the products not to let bad people into the networks. 
In other words Profinet networks are secured, for the most part, in the same manner as 
every other Ethernet based network. The only difference comes from the security as-
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pects emphasized. The top priority is generally given to availability so that Profinet and 
other automation systems are available at all times whereas in office networks the con-
fidentiality has the top priority so that data loss is prevented. Of course both aspects 
are important in both networks, but still one is emphasized slightly more than the other 
depending on the case. 
It seems that the future of industrial networks is in Ethernet based technologies such as 
Profinet due to Ethernet’s versatility and performance. It is also interesting to see how 
Industrial Ethernet will adapt to cloud computing and software defined intelligent net-
works that seem to be the trend in networking. The first steps in cloud technologies 
have been taken by Profinet with Proficloud. 
Further development of this subject could include designing and building a small 
Profinet test system with at least one IO controller and one or more IO devices and 
then reflect the design and security aspects introduced in this thesis to the process. In 
addition, the three attacks could be also tested in a controlled environment. 
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